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Abstract. This paper presents an overview of tools and techniques that can be 
used to detect potential vulnerabilities and design flaws in computer programs by 
applying mathematical knowledge in solving Boolean satisfiability (SAT) 
problems. SMT (Satisfiability Modulo Theories) algorithms check satisfiability of 
given logical formulas with regards to some background theory, so we can say 
that SMT represents an abstraction of general SAT theory. If a computer program 
can be presented as a logical expression, we can use SMT process to discover 
input values that can lead it to an inconsistent state. Obtaining logical structures 
from programming code can be done by symbolic execution techniques, which 
transform program execution flow to Boolean expressions suitable for analysis 
using SMT solving software. This paper proposes usage of Binary Analysis 
Platform (BAP) for symbolic execution and Z3 SMT Solver as SMT solving 
software. 
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1. Introduction
Mathematical SAT problems[8] are aimed at finding concrete boolean values for 
formula variables that satisfy given logical expression. Solving SAT problem means 
finding concrete values for variables of specified logical expression for which given 
formula evaluates to true (if such values can be found, we say that formula is 
satisfiable). If we consider each state that computer program can be in at a given 
moment to be a result of input data set which is transformed by programming constructs 
such as flow control commands, it is easily noticeable that such states can be 
represented as mathematical expressions with input data as variables. By finding data 
sets that lead to certain program states, we can backtrack which concrete data can lead a 
software program to states of interest. This approach can be used to track vulnerabilities 
and to generate exploits in order to conduct security testing of software platforms. The 
NP-completeness of SAT problems makes them relatively hard to implement in 
computer algorithms, but with recent development of computer software and hardware, 
we are witnessing emergence of a large number of software solvers for SAT problems 
[11]. The Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) problems extend SAT by supporting 
higher level theories such as Integer or Bitvector arithmetics (in contrast with SAT, 
which is able to reason only logical values and operations) which makes it especially 
suitable for modeling software constructs and methodologies. 
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In order to obtain Boolean expressions from programming code suitable for 
reasoning using SMT solvers, we use symbolic execution[4][5] which (in opposite to 
concrete execution) uses symbolic values for variables and results. Using symbolic 
values makes it possible to track all data paths within programming code instead just 
one concrete, which in turn results in expressing analyzed program in the format 
suitable for SMT solvers. As can be noticed from the previous discussion, a number of 
possible data flow paths to be analyzed grows with observed program complexity, so in 
order to process complex software systems, we use an approach called Concolic 
execution which combines methodologies from both symbolic and concrete execution. 
As an example of usage of described methods, we propose Binary Analysis Platform 
(BAP)[2] for obtaining SMT input data which is passed to Z3 SMT Solver[6]. 
2. SAT and SMT
As mentioned in the introduction, boolean satisfiability theories (SAT) study 
problems of finding variable values that satisfy given logical expression. Such 
expression is usually specified as a conjunction of logical terms called atoms. The 
formula is satisfied if it evaluates to > for given values. If such values can be found, a 
formula is satisfiable and the problem is solved. This process if often called solving the 
formula. For instance, consider following logical expression: 
(x + y ≤ 0)∧(x = 0)∧(¬a ∨(x = 1))∧(y ≥ 0) (1) 
where x and y are variables ranging over Z and a is logical variable. In order to solve 
this formula, our task is to find values for x,y and a that will evaluate an expression to >. 
For this concrete example, formula is satisfied for following values: x = 0,y = −10 and a 
= >, so the formula is satisfiable. Set of values that satisfy formula is called it’s model. 
Since SAT solving is theory-agnostic approach, operators that appear in expressions 
don’t work in the way we expect them to unless that is specified in theory definition. In 
first-order logic[9], a Theory is defined by the set of axioms that specify it’s syntax and 
semantics. The syntax of a theory specifies set of symbols used to construct formulas. It 
consists of signature Σ which defines function symbols (operators) and set of variables 
marked as V. Semantics of a theory is used to define rules of using symbols in 
expressions. For instance, each symbol is associated with a set of values µ. Logical type 
Bool is associated with {>,⊥}. As an extension of SAT, SMT works on already defined 
theories, so the syntax and semantics for our problem are predefined. For example, 
when working with on arithmetic problems, the notion for well-known operators such 
as + is exactly the one we learned in elementary school, there is no need for 
constructing any rules that define how it works. Most recent SMT solvers use SMT-
LIB[3] notation for Theories definition. Beside already built-in theories, we can use 
SMT-LIB to define our own theories and extend the platform to suit our needs. This 
support for higher level theories such as Integers or Array arithmetics makes SMT 
suitable to model software and hardware problems. If a certain system in a given state 
could be represented as a logical term described above, and if inputs (such as data input 
for software program or signals for some kind of controlling component) are considered 
to be variables in the formula, then it represents an SMT instance. Solving that instance 
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means finding the input set which led the system to a given state. Using this approach 
we can backtrack which occurrences can lead observed system into inconsistent states. 
3. SMT-LIB
The Satisfiability Modulo Theories Library (SMT-LIB) standard is initiative started 
in 2003 by the authors of [3] and maintained by worldwide community of SMT 
researchers that aims to define standard input format for SMT solvers and use 
community knowledge and expertise to form a common library of SMT benchmarks 
and definitions of widely used theories. SMT benchmarks are script-like input files that 
contain formula that is passed to SMT solver. Besides specifying benchmarks, SMT-
LIB notation is used to specify background theories. A set of already defined basic 
SMT theories (such as theory of real numbers, theory of arrays and theory of lists) can 
be found at [1], but it is also possible do define new background theories by specifying 
all the rules from scratch, combining multiple basic theories or making a new theory as 
a reduction of existent theory. 
SMT benchmark files contain formula definition and SMT solving commands 
written in SMT-LIB standard. Each term contained in the formula is specified using 
assert command and written in prefix notation. SMT-LIB benchmark that defines 
boolean expression: 
(x − y ≤ 0)∧(y − z ≤ 1)∧((z − x ≤−1)∨(z − x ≤−2)) (2) 
is shown in Listing 1.1 
(set-logic QF_LIA) 
(declare-const x Int) 
(declare-const y Int) 
(declare-const z Int) 
(assert (<= (- x y) 0)) 
(assert (<= (- y Z) 1)) 
(assert (or (<= (- z x) -1) 
(<= (- z x) -2))) 
(check-sat) 
(exit) 
Listing 1.1. SMT-LIB benchmark example 
4. Z3 SMT Solver
Z3 An Efficient SMT Solver is high-performance automatic SMT solver developed by 
Microsoft Research group in C++ programming language. The solver is specialized for 
solving software analysis and verification problems and it is available under open-
source license. It can be used as standalone SMT solver with standard benchmark files 
as inputs, or it can be implemented into existing software tools and invoked trough API. 
Z3 supports three formats for input files: SMT-LIB, Simplify[7] and DIMACS, and has 
API specification for C, Python and .NET programming languages. Z3 relies on modern 
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DPLL SAT solver combined with task-specific components such as simplifier, compiler 
and multiple theory solvers[6]. 
Z3 defines logical data type Bool and supports standard logical operators (AND, OR, 
EXOR, negation and implication) as well as the if-then-else construct (written as ite 
in Z3). Usage of logical variables and operations to prove implication transitivity is 
shown in Listing 1.2. 
(declare-const p Bool) 
(declare-const q Bool) 
(declare-const r Bool) 
(define-fun conjecture () Bool 
(=> (and (=> p q) (=> q r)) 
(=> p r ))) 
(assert (not conjecture)) 
(check-sat) 
Listing 1.2. Implication transitivity proof in Z3 
In this example, command define-fun is used to define a boolean function called 
conjecture which defines transitivity of implication operation. In order to show that 
implication is transitive relation, we need to show that it’s negation is not satisfiable. 
Z3 also supports linear and non-linear integer arithmetics in a pretty straightforward 
way, but with a few remarks. In linear arithmetics, Z3 does not automatically promote 
data types like most programming languages do, instead explicit conversion needs to be 
done using toreal command. Also, non-linear arithmetics (multiplying, division, 
exponentiation) is not completely supported in Z3, so the check-sat can return unknown 
as a result, meaning that formula is not decidable in Z3. 
Since most of the modern processor arithmetic is done on bit-vectors, it is interesting 
for us to show an example of bit-vector arithmetics in Z3. Z3 supports a wide range of 
bit-vector operations which have bv prefix (bvsub is bit-vector subtraction). 
5. Symbolic execution
Symbolic execution represents a powerful link for combining SMT solving and 
software security engineering. The computer program is constructed to run using 
concrete data values as inputs and results of its operations, which we call concrete 
execution. Unlike concrete execution, symbolic execution substitutes concrete 
expressions with symbolic variables in order to obtain data flow paths which lead to 
certain outputs. When logical expressions in control flow commands (such as if 
statement) are reduced to symbolic variables, the result of a logical operation is either 
that symbolic variable or it’s negation, which represents two possible paths that 
program execution can take. By executing conjunction of these values down the 
selected paths we are able to backtrack the concrete data inputs which led to the 
execution of observed part of the code. An example of a symbolic representation of 
programming code is shown in Figure 1. 
On the left side of Figure 1, we can see a simple piece of program code with logical 
expressions which lead program execution to one of the four possible outputs. Program 
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execution paths are shown in the right part of the figure. Each logical term branches a 
program into two possible paths (> or ⊥) and conjunction of these values leads to one of 
four outputs, marked as o1...o4. This way of representing the program flow is the core of 
symbolic execution and in order to, for example, trace the input which leads to output 
o3 we trace the path from the figure and write conditions in conjunction. This eventually 
gives us a logical formula (x > 12) ∧¬(x > 0). Passing such an expression to SMT 
solving algorithm can give us concrete values that satisfy the formula. 
Fig.1. Examle of symbolic execution 
When performing security assessment of software, in many cases (like when 
analyzing malicious programs) we don’t have the insight into observed system’s source 
code. Instead, analysis needs to be preformed on the binary level which complicates the 
whole process additionally. One thing that needs to be coped with is the absence of 
abstract constructs available in the higher level programming language. Also, binary 
code is more complex than the source code and large number of binary instructions 
have implicit sideeffects which are not directly obvious from the code. For these 
reasons, modern symbolic execution and binary code analysis algorithms transform 
concrete binary code to certain intermediate language which makes the analyzing 
process easier and platform independent. 
6. Binary Analysis platform
As a concrete example of a symbolic execution tool, this section presents Binary 
Analysis Platform (BAP)[2] developed at the Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, 
USA. BAP is designed to enable binary code analysis with an emphasis on software 
security assessment. BAP reduces complex instruction sets used by modern processing 
units to a language called BAPIntermediateLanguage(BIL). BIL represents link between 
platformdependent BAP front-end, and BAP back-end, which uses only the 
intermediate language and consists of various analysis tools such as graph generator, 
code generator and optimizer and symbolic execution tools. Front and back end are 
interacting using BAP commands such as toil or getfunctions which transform 
executable code to BIL. Obtained BIL code can be symbolically executed using the 
iltrans command in order to get SMT solver benchmarks. 
Current limitations of BAP platform include: 
– Support for x86 processor platforms only
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– Lack of support for floating point operations
– The correctness of intermediate language cannot be formally proved since
formal definitions of architectures do not exist. 
7. Practical example
In this concrete example, we analyze software code that verifies serial number validity 
in order to obtain valid number using the Z3 SMT solver. After transforming executable 
code using disassembler tool, analyzing it, we came to a conclusion that the code reads 
4 bytes from the user input and passes them to an algorithm which calculates the 
checksum. For valid checksum values, the algorithm returns true. Pseudo-code of the 
discussed an example is shown in Listing 1.3. 
s = get_input(4) 
num = to_number(s)  
num1 = num << 21  
num2 = num >> 21  
num = num1 OR num2  
num = num XOR 0xdeadbeef 
num = num + 0xdeadbeef  
if num == 0x2f5b7b03: 
return TRUE 
else: 
return FALSE 
Listing 1.3. Serial number verification pseudo-code 
As can be noticed from the Listing 1.3, in order to satisfy the algorithm, checksum 
needs to be equal to 0x2f5b7b03. Operation of checksum calculation is, obviously, not 
reversible, so just by knowing the result, there is no way of writing the equation for it. 
But modeling the problem as a logical formula based on the noticed constraints, we can 
use the SMT approach to get the solutions. Listing 1.4 shows the SMT-LIB benchmark 
that represents checksum calculation process. 
(set-logic BV) 
(declare-const input(_BitVec 32)) 
(assert 
   (= 
       (bvadd 
(bvxor 
(bvor 
(bvshl input (_ bv21 32)) 
(bvashr input (_ bv21 32))) 
#xdeadbeef) 
#xdeadbeef) 
          #x2f5b7b03)) 
(check-sat) 
(get-model) 
Listing 1.4. SMT-LIB model of the example argorithm 
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Using the Z3 solver, we obtain the model shown on the Listing 1.5, which shows us 
on solution for the algorithm (0x5f600470). 
sat (model 
(define-fun input() (_ BitVec 32) 
0x5f600470) 
) 
Listing 1.5. Z3 solution 
In order to obtain valid serial numbers, we can only accept the values that can be 
entered by the user via keyboard, which is not the case with our result. Running Z3 
solver until we get a valid result is time-consuming brute-force way, so a better 
approach is to write additional constraints to the formula which will limit input to 
readable values. For the sake of simplicity, this modification is hereby excluded. 
8. Conclusion
Usage of mathematical knowledge, especially practices from the field of logic are 
being more and more popular in research of techniques for software security analysis. 
Recent research activity along with a great technological progress of the software and 
hardware industries has emerged a number of platforms and tools which can be coupled 
to overcome the problems faced in initial stages their usage. Many studies and practical 
problems propose SMT solving algorithms for software and hardware flaw detections 
and analysis in general. In order to be processed by SMT solver, the observed system 
needs to be presented as a logical expression which can be obtained with symbolic 
execution techniques. 
In this paper, we proposed usage of Z3 SMT solver and Binary Analysis Platform as 
a powerful and flexible combination for software security assessment. Each system is 
discussed in the corresponding section with concrete examples which follow the 
discussion in order to help the readers get a better insight in presented techniques. In 
addition, two real-world examples were provided to illustrate the usage of BAP and Z3 
solver in conjunction. We hope that the paper presents a good overview and a solid 
starting point for researchers interested in combining mathematical methods in software 
engineering. 
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